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INTRODUCTION 
As the new millennium was ushered in, home sales exploded.  The year 
2000 proved to be a banner year for home purchases, and by the end of 
2004 more Americans owned homes than at any other time in history.1  
However, this positive momentum soon took a turn for the worse, starting 
 
∗ M.B.A., Ph.D.  Assistant Professor, Department of Finance, Whitman School of Manage-
ment, Syracuse University.  The author wishes to acknowledge Kelly Besaw of HomeHead-
quarters, Inc. who provided data and the initial framework for the study.  Her insight into 
the problem of predatory lending in Central New York has been invaluable. 
 1. See Peter Coy, The Housing Bust’s Latest Blow; New Research Shows the Recent 
Jump in the Rate of Homeownership Was Tied Largely to Loose Lending, BUS. WK., Nov. 5, 
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in the summer of 2004, when short-term interest rates rose dramatically.2  
The housing bubble began to burst.3  Almost immediately, home prices 
fell,4 and subsequently home sales have slowed significantly.5  According 
to the National Association of Realtors, as of June 2008, existing home 
sales declined 15.5% over the year before and dropped 2.6% from the pre-
vious month.6  Concurrently, interest rates continued to rise and now many 
people with variable-rate mortgages are unable to make their mortgage 
payments.7  Events such as a housing bubble and burst, plunging home val-
ues, declining home sales, and increasing interest rates each has the poten-
tial to amplify loan defaults. Further, when combined with nefarious tactics 
of predatory lenders, loan defaults quickly become mortgage foreclosures. 
In areas where predatory lending practices occur, the impact is not only 
devastating to the families involved but also poses a larger threat to the 
community as a whole because the homes targeted typically remain vacant 
for prolonged periods of time and are poorly maintained.  Uninhabited 
homes are breeding grounds for crime, which fosters neighborhood insta-
bility, in part because businesses are reluctant to locate to these areas.8 
Part I of this Article illustrates the common and growing problem of 
predatory lending, especially in low-income, inner-city, neighborhoods and 
demonstrates why we should take steps to change current practices.  Part II 
of this Article presents a case study of communities in Syracuse, New 
York; documents mortgage lending activities and foreclosure patterns in 
central New York; and reinforces the need for continued education 
throughout the home-buying process.  Although there are a number of stud-
ies that focus on predatory lending in large urban areas and one study with 
a focus on rural communities, this study provides additional novel insight 
 
 2. See Victimizing the Borrowers: Predatory Lending’s Role in the Subprime Mortgage 
Crisis, KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON, Feb. 20, 2008, http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/ 
article.cfm?articleid=1901. 
 3. See id. 
 4. See id. 
 5. See News Release, Nat’l Ass’n Realtors, Existing-Home Sales Down in June (July 
24, 2008), available at http://www.realtor.org/press_room/news_releases/2008/07/ehs_ 
down_in_june. 
 6. See id. 
 7. See Press Release, Mortgage Bankers Ass’n, Delinquencies and Foreclosures In-
crease in Latest MBA National Delinquency Survey (Sept. 5 2008), available at 
http://www.mortgagebankers.org/NewsandMedia/PressCenter/64769.htm; see also Mort-
gage Crisis Bailout:  Relief for Some, Risk for Others, KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON, Mar. 5, 
2008, http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article.cfm?articleid=1912. 
 8. DEBORAH GOLDSTEIN, JOINT CTR. HOUS. STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV. & NEIGHBOR-
HOOD REINVESTMENT CORP., UNDERSTANDING PREDATORY LENDING:  MOVING TOWARD A 
COMMON DEFINITION AND WORKABLE SOLUTIONS 5, 5-7 (1999), available at 
http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/finance/goldstein_w99-11.pdf. 
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into this pervasive problem by examining a smaller urban area, and de-
scribing a program that reduced foreclosures in low-income urban 
neighborhoods.  Part II also identifies red flags so that those involved in the 
eradication of predatory lending will be alerted and can take corrective ac-
tion.  Part III discusses recent federal legislation to strengthen mortgage 
lending guidelines and reduce foreclosures. 
I.  PREDATORY LENDING:  FEATURES AND TACTICS 
Predatory lending is a complicated issue currently debated among aca-
demics, real estate professionals, legislators, the Federal Reserve, and con-
sumers.  Although there is no consensus on a single definition of predatory 
lending, several common features are recognized.  Predatory lending typi-
cally entails unfair lending terms and tactics which limit or distort informa-
tion, and in some instances involve outright deceit and fraud.9  It strips po-
tential or current homeowners of their most valuable asset and is 
characterized by pressure tactics, false advertising, exorbitant fees, and in-
ordinately high interest rates. 
Predatory lenders usually target vulnerable members of society: women, 
the elderly, and low-income and minority populations.10  Although preda-
tory lending occurs more often in the subprime market, it can and does take 
place in the prime market as well.  Perpetrators can be found among mort-
gage brokers, lenders, home improvement contractors, appraisers, attor-
neys, and hybrid practitioners.11 
One common predatory practice occurs when lenders send a replica of a 
check in the mail with instructions to sign it, return it, and receive $10,000.  
Or they may sponsor commercials that say: “Bad credit?  No problem.  
We’ll give you a loan guaranteed!”  The advertisements appeal to people 
with low income, the elderly, and minorities who either cannot get loans 
from traditional banks or simply feel they would be turned down by a tradi-
tional lender.  Loans of this nature are set up for failure.  Eventually, the 
borrower falls behind either on the loan payments or on taxes.  When this 
occurs, the predatory lender will often pay the delinquent amount and, in 
compensation to itself, raise the customer’s monthly payment by hundreds 
 
 9. Id. at 8-9. 
 10. Elizabeth Renuart, An Overview of the Predatory Mortgage Lending Process, 15 
HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 478 (2004). 
 11. See id.; see also U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV. & U.S. DEP’T OF THE 
TREASURY, CURBING PREDATORY HOME MORTGAGE LENDING 37 (2000). 
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of dollars.12  The borrower is faced with payments she can no longer afford 
and foreclosure proceedings typically ensue. 
Another tactic used by predatory lenders is that they will originate a 
mortgage loan without regard to income, looking instead to the equity in 
the home to justify making the advance.  The reported equity is not based 
on the fair market value of the property but rather on appraisals that contain 
an inflated price for the home.  The lender will validate making the loan 
based on the falsely reported asset value.  In other instances, the lender will 
fraudulently change the income reported by the loan applicant, thereby giv-
ing the impression that the applicant has sufficient income to meet mort-
gage payments.13  At loan closing, since most victims of predatory prac-
tices do not have an attorney present, loan terms may be changed on 
documents to include numerous infractions such as higher-than-agreed-to 
interest rates, additional fees, balloon payments, mandatory credit insur-
ance, and prepayment penalties.14  After closing, the high-pressure sales 
tactics return in an attempt to coerce the borrower to refinance the loan, 
thereby generating additional interest and fees to the mortgage broker.  The 
opposite may also occur wherein the loan will carry stiff pre-payment pen-
alties making it nearly impossible for the mortgage holder to refinance if 
interest rates decline.15 
During loan servicing, mortgage payments may be held in a suspense 
account before being applied to a customer’s account.  The result is that the 
customer’s payment is posted as late and the servicer creates additional fee 
income for itself.16 
Each of these infractions in isolation is problematic, but in combination, 
which is often the case, they result in the “mammoth transfer of wealth 
 
 12. CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, UNFAIR AND UNSAFE:  HOW COUNTRYWIDE’S 
IRRESPONISBLE PRACTICES HAVE HARMED BORROWERS AND SHAREHOLDERS 2 (2008) 
[hereinafter UNFAIR AND UNSAFE], available at http://www.responsiblelending.org/ 
pdfs/unfair-and-unsafe-countrywide-white-paper.pdf. 
 13. Subprime Mortgage Crisis in California:  A Community Hearing to Examine Solu-
tions and Mitigation Efforts:  Hearing Before the Cal. Assembly Banking and Finance 
Comm., Informational 2007 Leg. (Cal. 2007) (testimony of Paul Leonard, Cal. Office Direc-
tor, Ctr. for Responsible Lending); ELLEN SCHLOEMER ET AL., CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE 
LENDING, LOSING GROUND:  FORECLOSURES IN THE SUBPRIME MARKET AND THEIR COST TO 
HOMEOWNERS 3 (2006), available at www.responsiblelending.org/pdfs/foreclosure-paper-
report-2-17.pdf; Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, Turning a Blind Eye:  Wall Street 
Finance of Predatory Lending, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2039, 2043-44 (2007); Jonathan L. En-
tin & Shadya Y. Yazback, City Governments and Predatory Lending, 34 FORDHAM URB. 
L.J. 757, 760-61 (2007). 
 14. Renuart, supra note 10, at 483-84. 
 15. Engel & McCoy, supra note 13, at 2044; Entin & Yazback, supra note 13, at 760-
61; Renuart supra note 10, at 480-87. 
 16. See UNFAIR AND UNSAFE, supra note 12, at 7-9; Renuart, supra note 10, at 484. 
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from middle- and lower-income families to the purveyors of debt” and 
“[t]he result of the equity stripping is that the wealth-building capacity of 
blacks and Hispanics may be permanently eliminated.”17  The impacts are 
injurious not just to the current victim but also for future generations.  The 
lost equity can never be recaptured and is certainly not available to be 
passed on to heirs. 
Although academics and community groups have been sounding the 
alarm for years, regulators and legislators finally stepped in to curb some of 
the abuses outlined above.  On July 15, 2008, the Federal Reserve System 
(“the Fed”) enacted new rules that will apply to all types of mortgage lend-
ers and should lead to more responsible lending in the future.  The follow-
ing is a description of the rules, as detailed by Chairman of the Board of 
Governors of the U.S. Federal Reserve Ben Bernanke in his semiannual 
monetary report to Congress: 
The final rules prohibit lenders from making higher-priced loans without 
due regard for consumers’ ability to make the scheduled payments and re-
quire lenders to verify the income and assets on which they rely when 
making the credit decision.  Also, for higher-priced loans, lenders now 
will be required to establish escrow accounts so that property taxes and 
insurance costs will be included in consumers’ regular monthly payments.  
The final rules also prohibit prepayment penalties for higher-priced loans 
in cases in which the consumer’s payment can increase during the first 
few years and restrict prepayment penalties on other higher-priced loans 
Other measures address the coercion of appraisers, servicer practices, and 
other issues.18 
If fully implemented, these amendments will greatly diminish the num-
ber of home mortgage foreclosures. 
II.  SYRACUSE CASE STUDY 
A. Neighborhood Characteristics/Area Examined 
This study examined mortgage lending and foreclosure patterns in one 
community in Syracuse, New York.19  Its residents are generally low-
 
 17. Renuart, supra note 10, at 485. 
 18. Semiannual Monetary Policy Report to the Congress:  Hearing Before the H. 
Comm. on Financial Servs., 110th Cong. (2008) (testimony of Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, 
Board of Governors, U.S. Federal Reserve), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/ 
newsevents/testimony/bernanke20080715a.htm; Truth in Lending, 72 Fed. Reg. 44031, 
44032 (Aug. 7, 2007) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 226). 
 19. The area investigated consists of the following year 2000 census tracts in the city of 
Syracuse:  30, 38, 39, 40, 42, 52, 53, 54, 58, and 59.  See map infra app A. 
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income and the majority are African American.  The neighborhood bounda-
ries are clearly defined by a railroad, major streets, Onondaga Creek, and 
interstate Route 81.20  This Article will refer to these areas as “SUN” 
neighborhoods.  SUN stands for Syracuse United Neighbors, a grassroots 
community organization whose goal is to improve conditions by creating 
safe neighborhoods that attract families. 
According to the 2000 census, 24,809 residents inhabited this area in 
8,625 homes.21  This represents a decline of over 6,300 people from the 
1990 census, or 20% of the area’s population. Thirty-one percent of the 
homes in SUN’s target area were owner-occupied: this figure varied by 
census tract from a low of 6% to a high of 51%.  By comparison, the 
homeownership rate in the entire city of Syracuse (including SUN 
neighborhoods) was 40%, while Onondaga County (in which Syracuse is 
located) had a homeownership rate of 64%; nationwide, the percentage of 
families who owned their home in 2000 was 66%.  The national homeown-
ership rate has consistently declined over the past three years, from a high 
of 69% in 2004 to 68.1% as of the second quarter of 2008.22  The expecta-
tion is that rates will continue to decline due to the rise in the number of 
foreclosures and the slumping housing market. 
In November 2001, there were 1,103 unoccupied homes in the city of 
Syracuse, representing a 240% increase in vacancies from the June 1993 
total of 324.  Although the target area contained only 15% of the city’s 
households, it accounted for 53% of vacant homes (588).  Vacant houses 
contribute to crime, violence and trash build-up.  Such negative conse-
quences combine to force responsible neighbors out, and as a result dis-
courage potential investors. 
 
 20. See infra app. A. 
 21. See U.S. Census Bureau, Onondaga County, New York by Census Tract (2000), 
http://factfinder.census.gov (go to “data sets”; go to “Census 2000 Summary File 1 (of 1) 
100-Percent Data”; follow Geographic Comparison Tables”; select “County”; select “New 
York”; select “Onondaga County”; then select “County Census Tract”). 
 22. See Press Release, U.S. Census Bureau News, U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, Census Bu-
reau Reports on Residential Vacancies and Homeownership, CB08-108 (July 24, 2008), 
available at http://blueprod.ssd.census.gov/hhes/www/housing/hvs/qtr208/files/q208press 
.pdf. 
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B. Bank Performance 
1. Conventional Mortgage Lending 
Regulation C, promulgated under the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act23 
(“HMDA”), requires banks to file an annual report detailing their business 
activities in communities.24  Information is readily available on race, in-
come, and residence of borrowers and whether they received or were de-
nied a mortgage loan.  Tables 1 and 2 represent lending patterns of the five 
largest traditional lenders in the city of Syracuse.  The HMDA data show 
an overall pattern of disinvestment in the SUN target area over the four-
year period examined. 
 
Table 1.  Number of Conventional Mortgage Loans made in SUN’s 
Neighborhoods 
Year M&T Key Bank Chase Fleet HSBC Total 
1997 16 2 0 0 2 20 
1998 6 4 4 0 0 14 
1999 6 3 1 0 1 11 
2000 2 1 4 1 0 8 
Total 30 10 9 1 3 53 
 
Table 2.  Number of Conventional Mortgage Loans made in Syracuse in 
2000.  The “cities” category includes SUN neighborhoods. 
Locality M&T Key Bank Chase Fleet HSBC Total 
SUN 2 1 4 1 0 8 
City 39 92 43 77 23 274 
Suburbs 137 282 100 388 105 1,012 
 
Table 1 shows that M&T Bank produced the most loans in SUN’s 
neighborhoods, originating a total of thirty conventional mortgage loans 
from 1997 to 2000, while Fleet Bank produced the least, with only one 
loan.  Overall, the number of conventional mortgage originations steadily 
declined in SUN’s neighborhoods from twenty loans in 1997, to fourteen in 
1998, eleven in 1999 and eight in 2000, ultimately resulting in a 60% drop 
in three years. 
 
 23. Home Mortgage Disclosure Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-200, 89 Stat. 1125 (codifed 
at 12 U.S.C. § 2501 (2006)). 
 24. Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (Regulation C), 12 C.F.R. § 203.2(c) (2002). 
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In 2000, as shown in Table 2, conventional mortgage bank lending by 
the five largest banks in SUN’s census tracts was low compared to mort-
gage lending in the city of Syracuse and its suburbs.  Although SUN’s 
neighborhoods made up 15% of the city’s households in the 2000 census, 
its neighborhoods received 0.6% of the conventional home loans made by 
the leading traditional lenders in the area. 
Moreover, as Table 3 reveals, banks’ cumulative loans are very low in 
SUN neighborhoods.  The number of conventional loans by all lenders in 
SUN’s ten census tracts was 207 in 2000; however, there were 2,081 total 
mortgage loans in the city of Syracuse and 8,058 in the suburbs. Whereas 
traditional lenders made less than half of all loans in SUN’s neighborhoods, 
they made 75% of the loans in the city and 85% of all loans in the suburbs.  
This is significant because, as shown in Table 3, when traditional lenders 
leave an area, subprime and predatory lenders step in to fill the void. 
 
Table 3.  2000 Lender Activity 
 Traditional Subprime Total 
 Loans Made Market Share Loans Made Market Share  
SUN 101 48.79% 106 51.21% 207 
City 1,561 75.01% 520 24.99% 2,081 
Suburbs 6,838 84.86% 1,220 15.14% 8,058 
 
In addition to low loan originations, the denial rates for racial minorities 
and residents of the south and near west neighborhoods are high.  As 
shown in Table 4, more than half of all loan applicants in SUN’s census 
tracts were denied conventional mortgage loans.  In 1999, 55% of African 
American, 72% of Hispanic, and 55% of white loan applicants were denied 
loans.  In 2000, 61% of African Americans, 50% of Hispanics, and 49% of 
whites did not receive conventional mortgages.25 
 
 25. Home Mortgage Disclosure Act of 1975, 12 U.S.C. § 2801 (2000). 
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Table 4.  Denial Rates by Race and Income in SUN’s Territory, 1999 and 
2000.  Income level for all categories are based on the U.S. Census defini-
tion 
AFR. AMERICAN 1999 2000 
Income Level Denied Loans Denial Rates Denied Loans Denial Rates 
Low 36 55.38% 38 61.29% 
Moderate 44 55.00% 37 63.79% 
Middle 24 60.00% 25 65.79% 
Upper 8 44.44% 11 47.83% 
Total 112 55.17% 111 61.33% 
City 256 55.25% 247 47.18% 
Suburbs 55 51.00% 49 44.70% 
HISPANIC 1999 2000 
Income Level Denied Loans Denial Rates Denied Loans Denial Rates 
Low 6 85.71% 4 50.00% 
Moderate 5 71.43% 5 45.45% 
Middle 1 50.00% 1 33.33% 
Upper 1 50.00% 2 100.00% 
Total 13 72.22% 12 57.20% 
City 31 70.00% 12 42.30% 
Suburbs 9 19.86% 12 27.62% 
WHITE 1999 2000 
Income Level Denied Loans Denial Rates Denied Loans Denial Rates 
Low 33 60.00% 15 51.72% 
Moderate 33 49.25% 22 51.16% 
Middle 20 66.67% 14 50.00% 
Upper 11 45.83% 7 36.84% 
Total 97 55.11% 58 48.74% 
City 541 33.94% 462 30.44% 
Suburbs 1,667 26.39% 1,409 24.69% 
 
High rejection rates pose similar risks to individuals and neighborhoods 
as do low commercial bank loan originations.  Smaller governments and 
civic organizations should pay attention when denial rates are high and tra-
ditional lenders leave an area en-masse because these factors serve as red 
flags that the neighborhood is changing and may be in decline.  In such 
cases, an intervention is necessary so that individuals are not burdened with 
mortgages, issued by predatory lenders, that they cannot afford. 
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2. Subprime Mortgage Lending 
In 1993, subprime loans accounted for 2% of the mortgage loans made 
in SUN areas—only four loans.  However, in 2000, 28 subprime lenders 
made a total of 106 loans, or 51% of the loan volume in SUN’s neighbor-
hoods.26  This is a concern because these loans tend to have high interest 
rates and exorbitant fees, making it difficult, if not impossible, for home-
owners to make monthly payments based on income. 
In a study completed by The National Predatory Lending Task Force, 
minority status was found to be significantly related to subprime lending, 
and nationwide, subprime lending was five times higher in predominately 
black neighborhoods than in predominately white neighborhoods.27  An-
other study states that even at upper-income levels, blacks received three 
times as many subprime loans as their upper-income white counterparts.28 
The problem with subprime lending is that it increases the likelihood 
that the loan will result in foreclosure.  Elizabeth Renuart posits that in the 
Chicago area, subprime loans were twenty times more likely to be fore-
closed than prime loans.29  Since predatory loans are more often subprime 
loans, the impact on foreclosures may be even greater.  A study by An-
thony Pennington-Cross determined that subprime loans are at least ten 
times more likely than prime loans to be ninety days or more delinquent, or 
in foreclosure.30 
Foreclosure rates are related to property risk and credit quality.31  The 
key to successful lending is to place the emphasis on traditional criteria in 
the evaluation of credit risk.32  This includes ensuring that borrowers can 
afford their loan payments (comprising escrows for homeowner’s insurance 
and property taxes) based on income.33  In addition, an affordable loan 
should carry a fixed payment, exclude penalties for prepayment, and be 
based on a legitimate market value for the property.  When lenders make 
loans without regard to income or inflate prices of homes in order to justify 
making a loan, the borrower is particularly vulnerable to potential loss. 
 
 26. See supra tbl.3. 
 27. Paul S. Calem et al., Neighborhood Patterns of Subprime Lending:  Evidence from 
Disparate Cities, 15 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 603, 603-22 (2004). 
 28. Renuart, supra note 11, at 477. 
 29. Id. at 478. 
 30. Anthony Pennington-Cross, Subprime Lending in the Primary and Secondary Mar-
kets, 13 J. HOUSING RES. 31, 48 (2002). 
 31. See Calem et al., supra note 25, at 620. 
 32. Larry Meeker & Forest Myers, Fed. Reserve Bank of Kansas City, Community Re-
investment Act Lending:  Is it Profitable?, 1996 FIN. INDUSTRY PERSP. 13, 26, available at 
http://www.kansascityfed.org/PUBLICAT/FIP/prs96-2.pdf. 
 33. See SCHLOEMER ET AL., supra note 13, at 32. 
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According to the Center for Responsible Lending (“CRL”), 7.2 million 
families hold subprime mortgages and 14.44% of these loans are in de-
fault.34  One in five subprime mortgages made in 2005-2006 is projected to 
end in foreclosure.  Entire neighborhoods have been engulfed by the ravag-
ing effects of foreclosure.35  The CRL estimates that nationally, homeown-
ers living near foreclosed properties can expect to see their property values 
decrease by $5000, on average, for a total decline in neighborhood value of 
$202 billion, affecting 40.6 million homes.36  The impact on lower-income 
neighborhoods is deemed to be even higher than the national average, gen-
erally estimated at a decrease of over $8,000 in property value.37 
C. Foreclosure Findings 
In the Syracuse community studied, a detailed review of Circuit Court 
records in Onondaga County was undertaken to assess the number of fore-
closures occurring in the community.  Kelly Besaw, a community represen-
tative, collected foreclosure data from the County Clerk’s office document-
ing addresses, dollar amount of loans, dates of loans, dates of foreclosures, 
and lending institutions for all properties in SUN’s target areas.  Ms. Besaw 
examined each foreclosed property file and tracked the data for this study.  
Business foreclosures were not evaluated, as the assessment focused on 
residential foreclosures. 
A preliminary study of foreclosures in SUN neighborhoods was con-
ducted beginning with fiscal year 2001, which looked at results from June 1 
through December 31, 2001.  Data showed that there were a total of sev-
enty-one homes in SUN’s target area that suffered foreclosure in seven 
months of 2001.38  An examination of these properties showed that thirty-
six (53%) were vacant. 
D. Education Program Intervention 
With this information in hand, SUN convened a meeting with the Onon-
daga County Clerk, who agreed to fund a pilot program for fiscal year May 
2002–April 2003 to reduce the number of foreclosures in the affected area.  
The Foreclosure Prevention Program (“FPP”) was developed in conjunc-
 
 34. CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, A SNAPSHOT OF THE SUBPRIME MARKET 1 (2007), 
available at http://www.responsiblelending.org/pdfs/snapshot-of-the-subprime-market.pdf. 
 35. See id. 
 36. CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, SUBPRIME SPILLOVER:  FORECLOSURES COST 
NEIGHBORS $202 BILLION; 40.6 MILLION HOMES LOSE $5,000 ON AVERAGE 1 (2008), avail-
able at http://www.responsiblelending.org/pdfs/subprime-spillover.pdf. 
 37. See id. 
 38. See infra tbl.4. 
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tion with a community organization called Home Headquarters (“HHQ”), 
and consisted of small grant issuance and mortgage default counseling.39  
In the early phase of the pilot program, more emphasis was placed on 
granting financial assistance to program participants, but the pilot was re-
tooled mid-year to shift its primary focus to counseling. 
The FPP had five major components.  First, there was counseling, help-
ing homeowners better understand their household finances, the foreclosure 
process, and related timelines.40  Included were intensive budget and credit 
counseling that better prepared the borrower to deal with financial obsta-
cles that might arise in the future.  Second, the program assisted borrowers 
with loss mitigation by employing foreclosure prevention options.41  Third, 
HHQ referred clients to other appropriate organizations that provide ser-
vices or resources to help homeowners stay in their homes, and litigate 
when appropriate.42  Fourth, the FPP involved outreach and preventative 
activities.  An FPP specialist would meet and work with community groups 
to promote education and participation in the program.43  Lastly, the pro-
gram provided assistance to homeowners with the completion of eligibility 
applications for financial assistance.44  Although this component of the 
program was de-emphasized, a small number of clients remained in need of 
financial assistance to keep their mortgage payments current.  HHQ ex-
pected that the monies loaned would be repaid.  In order to receive funding, 
a recipient had to be a Syracuse resident, and the property in question had 
to be the borrower’s primary residence.45  In addition, financial assistance 
recipients were required to meet Housing and Urban Development 
(“HUD”) income guidelines of 80% or lower, their property taxes could not 
be more than two quarters behind, and borrowers had to contribute at least 
25% of the delinquent amount.46 
 
 39. NeighborWorks Am., Winning Strategies in the NeighborWorks Network (2004), 
http://www.nw2.org/WinningStrategies/display.asp?strategy=1296#. 
 40. NEIGHBORWORKS CTR. FOR FORECLOSURE SOLUTIONS, PRESERVING 
HOMEOWNERSHIP:  ANALYZING THE ELEMENTS OF LEADING FORECLOSURE PREVENTION 
PROGRAMS 16 (2007) [hereinafter PRESERVING HOMEOWNERSHIP], available at 
http://www.nw.org/network/neighborworksProgs/foreclosuresolution-
sOLD/documents/NWO_Preservationfinal.pdf. 
 41. Id. at 17. 
 42. See NeighborWorks Am., supra note 39, at 2. 
 43. Id. 
 44. See PRESERVING HOMEOWNERSHIP, supra note 40, at 17. 
 45. Id. 
 46. See NeighborWorks Am., supra note 39, at 2; see also Home Headquarters, Inc., 
HUD Income Limits, http://www.homehq.org/improvement/hud.html (last visited Mar. 3, 
2009). 
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Once a homeowner was accepted into the program, a counselor was as-
signed to work with the homeowner to 1) complete a financial analysis and 
create a budget that would work for the client; 2) repair credit problems; 3) 
prepare the client for future financial emergencies; 4) negotiate with the 
mortgage company to make an affordable payment arrangement; and 5) an-
swer questions about the foreclosure process.47 
After December 2002, a second study was conducted to assess the effec-
tiveness of the FPP.  To foster a more accurate analysis, the foreclosure 
data were selected to compare the same seven months (June through De-
cember) of 2001 and 2002 to account for seasonal variations.  The results 
appear in Table 5. 
 
 47. HOME HEADQUARTERS INC., FORECLOSURE PREVENTION PROGRAM:  PROGRAM 
DESCRIPTION AND PARTICIPATION PROCESS, http://www.homehq.org/pdf/FP_Program_ 
Description.pdf#zoom=89.a (last visited Mar. 26, 2009). 
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Table 5.  Number of Foreclosures 
Month 2001 2002 
June 4 12 
July 5 3 
August 8 13 
September 10 7 
October 7 16 
November 15 3 
December 22 8 
Total 71 62 
 
Foreclosure patterns comparing the initial pre-FPP period (June–
December 2001) with the post-intervention period (June–December 2002) 
revealed a 12.7% drop overall in the number of foreclosures.  The largest 
decrease took place during the last two months of the year: in November 
foreclosures declined 80% (from fifteen to three), and in December, 64% 
(from twenty-two to eight). 
A likelihood ratio test was performed to determine whether economic 
factors (for example, unemployment and poverty rates) contributed to fore-
closure findings.  Although the results were not statistically significant, 
there were problems with the analysis including an insufficient number of 
observations (ten U.S. census tracts in Syracuse’s inner city—109 observa-
tions) and the short time frame between the two periods. 
The pilot program was retooled mid-way through its implementation in 
October 2002, to emphasize homeowner education.  Despite this retooling, 
there was no noticeable change in economic conditions for the affected area 
from 2001 to 2002.  Therefore, the marked improvement realized in No-
vember and December is deemed to be attributable to the FPP counseling 
program. 
With the rapid shift of loans from traditional to subprime lenders, the 
number of foreclosures will likely increase unless preventative measures 
are taken. The data show that over a seven-year period, from 1993 to 2000, 
subprime loans in SUN’s census tracts experienced phenomenal growth, 
from four to 106 loans, an increase of 2,500%.  At the same time, lending 
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by conventional operators was negligible, with only eight loans in 2000.  
More subprime loans often result in more foreclosed loans. 
In June 2008, the number of foreclosure filings reported nationwide in-
creased 121% over the previous year, and 14% over the previous quarter.48  
During the same time period, foreclosures in the city of Syracuse rose 
155% and 5.75%, respectively.49  If anticipated increases continue to occur 
nationwide and in Syracuse, we should expect increases in foreclosures in 
SUN’s communities as well.  To safeguard against this prospect, an inter-
vention is crucial.  The counseling program implemented in SUN’s 
neighborhoods has shown promising results.  During the pilot, foreclosures 
dropped nearly 13%.  Even more dramatic declines (80% and 64%) oc-
curred in the two months following the retooling of the program to provide 
more homeowner education. 
Although the FPP was not funded for 2003-2004, financial support was 
allocated for fiscal years 2004 and 2005.  Data displayed in Table 6 suggest 
that it was money well spent. 
 
Table 6.  FPP Summary.  There was no system in place after implementa-
tion of FPP to track results by month.  Totals in Table 4 (pre fully imple-
mented FPP) were manually recorded. 
Fiscal Year  No. Participants No. Homes Foreclosed 
2004-2005 94 12 
2005-2006 100 4 
2006-2007 102 7 
 
Between May 1, 2004, and April 30, 2005, ninety-four clients attended 
an initial intake session for the FPP.  Forty-eight percent of the lenders 
were subprime or predatory.  With the counseling assistance provided, 44% 
of the clients were able to keep their homes, resulting in only twelve fore-
closures.  During fiscal year 2005–2006, the number of clients seeking as-
sistance grew to 100.  Fifty-six percent of the lenders involved with these 
clients were either subprime or predatory.  Through early intervention and 
counseling, of 100 clients interviewed, there were only four foreclosures.50  
 
 48. Press Release, RealtyTrac Inc., Foreclosure Activity Up 14 Percent in Second Quar-
ter (July 25, 2008), available at http://www.realtytrac.com/ContentManagement/press 
release.aspx?ChannelID=9&ItemID=4891&accnt=64847. 
 49. Id. 
 50. See HOME HEADQUARTERS, INC., ANNUAL REPORT, FORECLOSURE PREVENTION 
PROGRAM, MAY 1, 2004–APRIL 30, 2005 (2006). 
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Fiscal year 2006–2007 saw similar positive results, ending the year with a 
mere seven foreclosures.  The FPP in Syracuse has netted consistently posi-
tive results and has shown that with each year of implementation, outcomes 
remain strong.  Once the program was fully funded (FY 2004–2005), the 
number of applicants entering the program increased by over 6% in its first 
year and the number of homes foreclosures dropped significantly.  From 
2004–2006 participants experienced foreclosure levels of 13%, 4%, and 
7%.51  The implication is that for the years 2004–2006, 87%, 96%, and 
93% of FPP participants were able to remain in their homes.52  Local lead-
ers should take note of the value of such interventions and should provide 
adequate funding for such programs so that families and neighborhoods 
remain intact.  The program cost is relatively small ($80,000 to $100,000 
per year) compared with the benefits to individuals, neighborhoods and 
communities.  In a December 2006 report completed by the CRL, foreclo-
sures are estimated to have cost homeowners and communities, as much as 
$164 billion.53 
III.  RECENT FEDERAL LEGISLATION 
In an attempt to contain the devastation caused by subprime lending, 
Congress passed H.R. 3221, the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 
2008, to deal with the mortgage crisis and resultant foreclosures in July 
2008.54  Several components of the bill, signed by President Bush on July 
30, 2008, specifically address the needs of struggling homeowners and 
neighborhoods.  Reforms stipulate that under certain conditions, a home-
owner facing foreclosure can elect to refinance to a more affordable thirty-
year, fixed-rate Federal Housing Administration (“FHA”) mortgage.55  In 
addition, $180 million has been earmarked for housing counseling and $30 
million pledged to help defray legal costs associated with keeping a 
home.56  In an effort to decrease the negative impact that vacant buildings 
have on neighborhoods, $3.9 billion in grants is targeted at communities 
with the highest foreclosure rates to purchase foreclosed and abandoned 
properties.57  While these actions are commendable, implementing finan-
 
 51. Id. 
 52. See id. 
 53. See SCHLOEMER ET AL., supra note 13, at 3. 
 54. Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-289, 122 Stat. 2654. 
 55. Melissa Block & John Ydstie, Housing Bill Would Aid Struggling Homeowners, 
NPR, July 23, 2008, www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyID=92836904&ft+1&f= 
1003. 
 56. See § 2305, 122 Stat. at 2854. 
 57. See Block & Ydstie, supra note 55; see also 154 CONG. REC. S6354-55 (daily ed. 
July 7, 2008) (statement of Sen. Dodd). 
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cial education programs may diminish the need for massive foreclosure 
prevention policies. 
A. Education Is Key 
Consumer education is a critical component in the fight against future 
predatory lending victimization.  For example, up to half of all subprime 
borrowers could have qualified for conventional financing.58  “[A] lack of 
financial sophistication may lead borrowers to choose subprime products.  
This suggests that financial education might be effective in helping people 
obtain lower-cost credit.”59  Furthermore, failing to provide clients with 
this information while steering borrowers in minority neighborhoods to-
ward high-cost loans may violate fair lending laws. 
Since cities are often unable to take legal action to restrain predatory 
lending,60 counseling interventions are all the more important to reduce 
foreclosures and curb the decay of urban neighborhoods.  Kristopher 
Rengert, the Managing Director of Housing Policy Research at the Fannie 
Mae Foundation, states that “[e]ducation remains essential to increase the 
knowledge of both lenders and borrowers.”61  Financial counseling pro-
grams at each stage of the mortgage lending process are necessary to pre-
vent the detrimental impacts of imprudent and predatory lending.  Players 
in the mortgage market should be required to disclose all financial products 
available using financial terms that are clear, concise, and comprehensive 
so that consumers can make more informed and prudent decisions.  Com-
munities must champion financial literacy programs so that homeowners 
will have a complete understanding of the implications of buying a home.  
Homeowners must be empowered by becoming knowledgeable about the 
myriad tactics of unscrupulous lenders.  If pre- or post-purchase counseling 
is not available, evidence suggests that foreclosure-prevention counseling 
produces positive outcomes for individuals.62  Community organizations 
are in the best position to facilitate this process.  Legislators must demand 
that those doing business in their jurisdiction adhere to fair lending laws 
and treat the citizenry fairly.  Otherwise, everyone loses. 
 
 58. Renuart, supra note 10, at 475-76. 
 59. Calem et al., supra note 27, at 618. 
 60. See Entin & Yazback, supra note 13, at 763-64. 
 61. Kristopher M. Rengert, Editor’s Introduction, 15 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 449, 450 
(2004), available at http://content.knowledgeplex.org/kp2/cache/documents/58725.pdf. 
 62. See supra Part II.D. 
PHILLIPS_CHRISTENSEN 5/5/2009  2:05:23 PM 
506 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XXXVI 
CONCLUSION 
Predatory lending is typically characterized by fraud and abuse, the de-
structive consequences of which affect not only the victim, but also entire 
neighborhoods and communities, especially in urban areas.  The impact is 
devastating on many fronts:  the individual suffers financial loss and hu-
miliation; inner-city neighborhoods lose out because businesses are reluc-
tant to locate to areas where there is evidence of blight; the city loses a 
much needed economic injection that results from an improved tax base; 
and even lenders suffer, who risk facing severe financial loss as they write 
off unrecoverable loan balances. 
The Fed has taken action to close lending loopholes63 and Congress has 
implemented policies to aid subprime mortgage holders by allowing them 
to renegotiate contracts in the hope of stemming the tide of mortgage fore-
closures.64  The plan approved by Congress covers up to $300 billion in 
mortgages and applies to approximately 400,000 distressed homeowners.  
Although many homeowners may not be able to benefit from the recent 
changes, the key to preserving home ownership over the long run is educa-
tion.  The inclusion of financial education and counseling as part of com-
prehensive housing reform enhances the well being of the nation’s citi-
zenry, neighborhoods, and overall economy.  At the very least, and for only 
a nominal expenditure, foreclosure-prevention education can reduce the 
negative effects of predatory lending so that victims, neighborhoods, and 
cities are protected.  Congress should continue to support such initiatives. 
 
 63. Truth in Lending, 74 Fed. Reg. 5244-01 (Jan. 29, 2009) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. 
pt. 226). 
 64. Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-289, § 2402, 112 
Stat. 2654, 2855. 
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APPENDIX A:  MAP OF THE SUN AREA OF STUDY. 
